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Abstract   
 
This paper analyzes the impact of the 2008-2009 crisis on new firms’ initial capital 
structure. There is strong evidence that the recent financial crisis has severely affected 
not only firm creation and firm survival but also its ability to obtain external financing. 
Financial institutions and vulnerable countries are lso struggling to keep their finances 
in order amidst the financial turmoil in the banking sector and the near-bankruptcy of 
some countries. Using Portuguese micro-level firm and matched employer-employee 
data that contain unique and detailed information on firms, founders and year-end 
financial data, we first evaluate the effect of thefinancial crisis on firm entry. Then, we 
evaluate the changes on new firms’ initial capital structure in the period between 2004 
and 2009. Particularly, we evaluate the effect of the crisis on internal and external 
capital, and within the last category, leasing, trade credit and bank loans. Results 
suggest that firms in Portugal were somewhat affected by the financial crisis. However, 
the magnitude of the results is not severe. Our results show that firm entry was 
negatively affected in 2009 by 0.02, showing that the financial crisis started to impact 
firm creation in 2009. Also, data shows a decrease of 0.03 in external capital and an 
increase of 0.03 in internal capital in 2009, suggesting a substituting effect between 
outside and internal financing. Regarding trade credit, results show an increase of 0.20 
in 2008 and 0.18 in 2009, pointing to an increase in this kind of financing as the 
financial crisis settles in Portugal. Finally, no significant effect was found on leasing, 
short-term bank loans and long-term bank loans due to the financial crisis.  
 
JEL Classification: G32, L26, M13 





Esta dissertação analisa o impacto da crise de 2008- 9 na estrutura de capital inicial 
das novas empresas. Existem fortes evidências de que a crise financeira afectou 
severamente não só a criação e sobrevivência das nov  empresas mas também a sua 
capacidade de obter financiamento externo. Instituições financeiras e países mais 
vulneráveis têm tido dificuldades em manter a sua situação financeira estável no meio 
do tumulto financeiro que afectou gravemente o sector financeiro e quase levou alguns 
países a falência. Utilizando uma base de dados única de empresas, fundadores e 
empregados com informação detalhada sobre as característi as demográficas e 
educacionais de cada individuo e informação financeira, avaliamos, em primeiro lugar, 
o efeito da crise financeira na criação de empresas. Seguidamente, avaliamos as 
alterações na estrutura de capital inicial das emprsas no período compreendido entre 
2004 e 2009, nomeadamente no capital interno e externo, e dentro desta ultima 
categoria, no leasing, no trade credit e nos empréstimos bancários. Os resultados 
sugerem que as empresas em Portugal foram afectadas pela crise financeira. No entanto, 
a magnitude dos resultados não é severa. Os resultados mostram que a criação de 
empresas foi negativamente afectada em 2009 em 0.02, mostrando que a crise financeira 
apenas começou a ter um efeito negativo na criação de empresas em 2009. Os dados 
também mostram uma diminuição de 0.03 no capital externo e um aumento de 0.03 no 
capital interno em 2009, reflectindo o efeito de substituição entre financiamento externo 
e fundos internos. Relativamente ao trade credit, os resultados mostram um aumento de  
0.20 em 2008 e de 0.18 em 2009, sugerindo um aumento d s e tipo de financiamento a 
medida que a crise se instala em Portugal. Por fim, não foram encontradas evidencias 
5 
 
empíricas sobre o impacto da crise financeira no leasing e nos empréstimos bancários 
de curto e de longo prazo. 
 
Classificação JEL: G32, L26, M13 

























I wish to thank my supervisor, Prof. Ana Venâncio, for the recommendations, support 
and availability which were vital for the success of this paper. 
 
We thank the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and Social Security and Gabinete de 
Estratégia e Planeamento for giving us access to the matched employer-employee data.  
 
We also thank the Instituto Nacional de Estatistica for providing us with the financial 
information database and for matching it to the employer-employee database. 
 
All errors remain our own. Views expressed are those f the author and do not 
necessarily reflect those of any branch or agency of the Government of Portugal. 
 
Finally, I also wish to thank my family and friends for the continued and endless 












List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Portugal’s GDP Growth Rate (2000-2010; %) 44 
Figure 2: Portugal’s Gross Consolidated Debt (2000-2 10; % of GDP) 44 
Figure 3: Portugal’s 10 Year Government Bond Yield (%, 2000-2012) 45 






















List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary of the Empirical Evidence on the Determinants of Capital Structure 46 
Table 2: Summary of Portugal’s Economic Performance by NUTS III Regions 50 
Table 3: Dependent Variables and Description 51 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 52 
Table 5: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Firm Entry (LPM) 53 
Table 6: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Firm Entry (Logit) 54 
Table 7: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Firm Entry (Probit) 55 
Table 8: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Inter al Capital 56 
Table 9: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on External Capital 57 
Table 10: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Short-Term Bank Loans 58 
Table 11: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Long-Term Bank Loans 59 
Table 12: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Trade Credit 60 
















1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 10 
2. Literature Review .................................................................................................................... 13 
2.1 Sources of Finance for New Ventures ............................................................................... 13 
2.2 Theories of Capital Structure ............................................................................................ 16 
2.3 The Determinants of Capital Structure: Empirical Evidence ............................................ 18 
2.4 The Impact of Macroeconomic Conditions ....................................................................... 19 
3. Theory and Hypothesis............................................................................................................ 22 
4. Portugal’s Macroeconomic and Financial Environmet ......................................................... 25 
5. Data and Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................ 28 
6. Methodological Approach, Variables and Results .................................................................. 31 
7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 38 













The belief that lack of financial capital limits firm entry, performance, and survival is 
not new, and has grown during the recent economic crisis. Lack of finance is perceived 
as one of the major obstacles to firm’s growth and investment.1 Nevertheless, financial 
capital is even more crucial for new ventures as they often struggle to survive with very 
low or no income in the first years. Ventures with a larger pool of financial resources 
can invest more in innovation and marketing, recruit higher quality individuals and have 
higher flexibility to overcome potential threats or managerial mistakes.  
 
When there is an economic shock, market failure or credit crunch, smaller and riskier 
ventures will have more difficulties in obtaining sufficient funds (Berger and Udell, 
1998), which may lead to a decrease in performance, investment, and even failure 
(Gries and Naude, 2011). Recent studies strongly demonstrate this point. 
Entrepreneurial activity has declined sharply with the recent financial crisis as 
entrepreneurs face more difficulties in starting their businesses (Bosma and Levie, 
2010; Lerner, 2010; Shane, 2011). These difficulties are likely to extend to funding 
decisions. Therefore, in this study, we will evaluate the changes in the sources of 
finance for new ventures during the 2008-2009 financi l crisis. 
 
While there has been some research on understanding the determinants of firms’ initial 
capital structure and on evaluating the impact of macroeconomic conditions on firm 
creation, the effect of the 2008-2009 financial crisis on ventures’ initial capital structure 
decisions and sources of finance remain partially unexplored and therefore it will be the 
                                                          
1 As suggested by Watson, Hogarth-Scott and Wilson (1998); Chandler and Hanks (1998); Ortqvist et al. (2006); Bhaird and Lucey 
(2006); Musso and Schiavo (2007) and Gries and Naude (2010), lack of finance is one of the reasons whysome businesses fail or 
cease their activities. 
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focus of this study. Our paper contributes to this discussion by answering the following 
research questions: 1) What effect did the financial risis have on ventures’ initial 
capital structure? and; 2) How did new ventures cope with difficulties in raising money? 
 
To answer our key questions, we use data from Portugal. We combine firm-level 
financial data with a matched employer-employee database. Our data provides detailed 
information on new firms established in each municipality between 2004 and 2009. For 
each firm, we gather detailed information on the characteristics and year-end financial 
data of the start-up, and also founder demographic and educational characteristics. 
 
Portugal provides an excellent context in which to evaluate the impact of the current 
financial crisis on start-ups’ financial decisions. Portugal has experienced an uneven and 
modest economic growth rate in the period between 2000 and 2009. Also, during the 
last two decades, the country has experienced high levels of public deficit and public 
debt. With the increased pressure from bond traders and ratings agencies in late 2010 
and early 2011, interest rates on sovereign debt increased dramatically, forcing the 
Portuguese government to request a bailout package from the International Monetary 
Fund/European Union in April 2011. This distress situation ended up spreading to the 
private sector. 
 
Our results show that firm entry decreased by 0.02 in 2009, suggesting that the financial 
crisis started to impact firm creation in 2009. Results also show that internal capital 
increased and external capital decreased in 2009 both by 0.03, showing that availability 
of external financing tightened and internal sources w re used to compensate this fact. 
In terms of trade credit, results show an increase of 0.20 in 2008 and 0.18 in 2009, 
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showing an increase in this type of financing perhaps due to more restrictions on outside 
financing. Regarding leasing, short-term bank loans d long-term bank loans, no 
changes were obtained in these variables before and after the financial crisis. Therefore, 
results suggest that until 2009, the financial crisis did not fully impact start-ups’ 
formation and their capital structure in Portugal. 
 
This study has implications for policy makers and practitioners. A more thorough 
understanding of the impact of the financial crisis on financial sources can help policy 
makers to define better funding programs and policies for start-ups. On the other hand, 
practitioners will be able to understand which funding strategies are available to cope 
with the crisis and determine alternative sources of funding. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the relevant literature regarding the theories on ve tures’ capital structure and the 
impact of macroeconomic conditions on entrepreneurial activity. Section 3 presents the 
theory and the hypothesis that will be tested. Section 4 reviews Portugal’s 
macroeconomic and financial environment in the last two decades. Section 5 provides a 
description of our dataset and descriptive statistics. Section 6 discusses our 
methodological approach, econometric methods and variables and presents our results. 








2. Literature Review 
 
Firm’s capital structure and financing decisions have been thoroughly studied since 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) seminal article regarding the irrelevance of capital 
structure decisions on the value of a company. In this section, we will start by 
summarizing the main sources of funding available to firms in general and to new 
ventures; next, we provide a summary of the theories of finance and empirical work on 
the determinants of firm’s capital structure; then, to conclude this section we present the 
main conclusions from the relevant literature regarding the effect of macroeconomic 
conditions on firm’s capital structure and the impact of the current financial crisis on 
new venture creation. 
 
2.1 Sources of Finance for New Ventures 
 
To finance their investments, established firms raie both debt and equity. Within the 
broad categories of debt and equity, there are a variety of instruments and vehicles that 
firms can use. Most commonly, debt is raised through short or long-term bank loans, 
bond loans or leasing. Equity can be obtained from current shareholders, venture 
capitalists, private equity investors and new investors by issuing common stock. The 
latter is only available for publicly traded firms (Ang, 2000).  
 
New ventures have more difficulties in raising financial capital compared to established 
and large companies. Start-ups have no prior financial or operating history and hence, 
no reputation or track-record (Cassar, 2004; Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2007), and 
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therefore face unique problems2 at almost every stage of their development (Walker, 
1989; Ang, 2000; Cassar, 2004). New ventures may not be able to obtain all of the 
desired capital if they lack significant assets that c n be used as collateral (Cosh, 
Cumming and Hughes, 2009). Korosteleva and Mickiewicz (2011) state that one of the 
common problems for start-ups is raising sufficient capital to launch and operate 
successfully and thus is one of the major constraints for entrepreneurship. Therefore, the 
choices of funding are narrower for new and small private firms.  
 
In the context of new ventures, the categorization of debt and equity is blurred and 
consequently previous studies propose the internal a d external capital framework 
(Myers, 1984; Myers, 2001). In this framework, inter al and external capital are divided 
into debt and equity.3 Usually, firms use internal sources (i.e. internally generated cash 
flows) to fund their investments (Damodaran, 2004). However, this kind of funding can 
be insufficient, and external sources are used to cope with additional financing needs. 
To finance their businesses on very early stages, entrepreneurs use their own personal 
savings and raise funds from friends and family.4 At this stage, the finances of the firm 
are intertwined with those of the entrepreneur (Coleman, 2008) and business bankruptcy 
can cause personal bankruptcy (Ang, 1992). Bank loans, which are usually guaranteed 
by the entrepreneurs’ personal assets, and trade creditors, have also been shown to be 
important sources of finance on ventures’ early stages.5 Over time, retained profits and 
short-term financing become the main sources of financing for small firms (Lucey and 
Bhaird, 2006). In fact, Robb and Robinson (2010) find that owner-backed bank loans 
                                                          
2 Some of these unique problems relate to the non-disclosure of financial information and more severe information asymmetries. For 
a detailed review on the uniqueness of small firms, see Ang (2000). 
3 Regarding internal capital, equity refers to the initial capital and the cash flow provided by the founder, whereas debt refers to 
shareholders’ loans. In what concerns external capital, equity refers to venture capitalists, angels, and private firms, whereas debt 
refers to short and long-term bank loans and other types of loans. 
4 As stated by Ang (1992); Berger and Udell (1998); Ang (2000); Cassar (2004); Coleman (2008); Gartner, Frid and Alexander 
(2010); and Lerner (2010). 
5 See, for example, Walker (1989); Berger and Udell (1998); Ang (2000); and Bitler, Robb and Wolken (2001). 
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and business credit cards are the primary source of financing for start-up firms during 
their first year, although informal investors are also important. Their evidence refute the 
commonly held idea that start-ups lack access to formal capital markets and thus are 
forced to rely on informal financing and bootstrap financing.6 Bootstrapping methods 
are generally used as a reactionary measure to financial constraints, and firms that are 
more likely to bootstrap are highly-leveraged, underperforming and cash-constrained. 
Young firms tend to use owner-related, joint-utilization and delaying-payments methods 
of bootstrapping, which may be detrimental to subsequent firm performance, 
particularly in periods of financial constraint (Ebben, 2009). Crowdfunding7 has 
recently been used to finance start-ups, however its importance is relatively small. 
 
Entrepreneurs desire to maintain control of the firm, due to the prestige and status of 
ownership, power to decide on business strategy and independence from superiors 
(Huyghebaert and Van De Gucht, 2007; Coleman, 2008), and hence some may refrain 
from using venture capitalists (VCs) and angel funds on early stages. VCs usually play 
an active role in firms in which they invest, providing mentoring, strategic advice, 
human resource services and support in the marketing of products. VC investment is 
sometimes done through multistage financing in order to reduce information asymmetry 
issues, as more information is gathered through time (Ang, 2000). VCs also certify the 
value of companies to the marketplace. However, regardless of the benefits of VCs, this 
source of funding can be very expensive as it usually demands high rates of return for 
its investments (Denis, 2004). Angel investing is usually done at new ventures’ early 
                                                          
6 Bootstrap financing are methods for obtaining finance that collectively reduce the need for outside funds. For example, the use of 
owner-provided funding, factoring, trade credit, joint-utilization of facilities or resources and delaying payments are some of the 
most common bootstrapping methods. For more information on bootstrapping and the financial condition of small firms, see Ebben 
(2009). 
7 Crowdfunding refers to the collective efforts of ind viduals who pool their resources in order to obtain funding for start-ups or 




stages in the life cycle,8 and their investments are typically smaller and concentrated on 
younger companies.  It is reported that angels do not provide as much support services 
to the companies as VCs, but act as a type of bridge financing until the firm is able to 
receive VC financing (Denis, 2004). Angels differ from VCs in that they are often 
private and wealthy individuals and do not operate in a structured market as VCs do. 
 
2.2 Theories of Capital Structure 
 
Several theories have been put forward to explain the capital structure of firms, 
targeting mostly established firms.  
 
The trade-off theory argues that firms will evaluate the benefits and costs of having 
debt,9 and will therefore find an optimal balancing between debt and equity in order to 
maximize the value of the company through the financial structure (Castanias, 1983; 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Damodaran, 2004).  
 
Another theory that analyzes the capital structure of firms through time is the life-cycle 
theory. This theory states that the financing alternatives and decisions of firms vary 
according to their stage of development, and therefore irms seek different types of 
funding according to their particular stage in the life of the business (Berger and Udell, 
1998). The life-cycle theory applies to young firms. In support of this fact, Walker 
(1989) concludes that small firms change their capital structure as they develop from 
new firms to developed, established and finally mature firms. As such, the capital 
structure of small firms is time and industry-depend t, which influence the total level 
                                                          
8  This type of investment is commonly referred to as seed capital. 
9 Benefits on the use of debt include interest tax shields and higher discipline imposed on managers regarding investment 
opportunities; Costs of using debt include agency costs of debt and financial distress costs. 
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of debt as well as its maturity structure. The propo tion of funds from insiders 
(entrepreneurs’ wealth, business associates, family and friends) rises during the early 
stages of the firms’ life cycle, while the proportin from external financing (banks, 
venture capitalists and private investors) decreases. These patterns eventually reverse as 
the firm matures (Fluck, Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 1998).  
 
The financing decisions of firms have also been associated with the pecking order 
theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). This theory states that firms have a 
tendency to rely on internal sources of funds, and if external sources of finance are 
needed they prefer external debt to external equity financing. This means that firms 
have a preference for less risky and cheaper sources of finance first. This theory is 
associated with the problem of asymmetric information, in which managers usually 
have better information about the firm than outside nvestors. When information 
asymmetries are high, a higher risk is perceived by outside investors who tend to 
demand a premium, which results in a high cost of capital. Information asymmetries can 
also lead to moral hazard (De Meza and Webb, 1987), adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) 
and risk shifting incentives.10 The pecking order theory of finance is also associated 
with entrepreneurial ventures, as information asymmetry issues complicate access to 
start-up capital (Nofsinger and Wang, 2011).  While several authors conclude that the 
traditional pecking order theory is applicable to start-ups and small firms,11 this issue is 
still a topic of discussion. For example, Garmaise (2001) argues that the pecking order 
is reversed for new and small ventures, where outside investors like banks and venture 
capitalists have greater expertise in evaluating the quality of the project than the 
                                                          
10 Moral hazard problems arise when managers take undue risks, being the cost of those risks borne by investors. Adverse selection 
refers to the fact that when there are information asymmetries, bad investments may be chosen by investors in detriment of good 
ones. Risk shifting problems occur when managers take excessive risks for the benefit of their shareholders but at the expense of 
debtholders, which usually occurs when firm leverag is high. 
11 See, for example, Chittenden, Hall and Hutchinson (1996); Berger and Udell (1998); Ang (2000); Lucey and Bhaird (2006); 
Coleman (2008); Cosh, Cumming and Hughes (2009); and Robb and Robinson (2010). 
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entrepreneur, and therefore entrepreneurs prefer ext nal equity to debt financing. Banks 
tend to reduce their exposure to information asymmetry problems by financing a 
smaller portion of debt and limiting loan size. Small firms tend to compensate this fact 
with leasing and trade credit (Michaelas, Chittenden and Poutziouris, 1999; 
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2007). In fact, leasing eems to bring some advantages 
to small firms.12 
 
2.3 The Determinants of Capital Structure: Empirical Evidence 
 
Most of the studies regarding the capital structure of firms are based on the 
determinants of capital structure choice. Asset structure (tangibility of assets) seems to 
be the most important determinant of firm’s capital structure, notwithstanding some 
controversy that still exists regarding the sign of the relationship.13 Firms in high growth 
industries tend to raise a significantly larger fraction of bank debt (Huyghebaert and 
Van de Gucht, 2007; Cosh, Cumming and Hughes, 2009). Industry effects, 
macroeconomic conditions and time also appear to influe ce the capital structure of 
small and start-up firms.14 The operating risk and size of a firm have also been shown to 
have positive relationships with leverage,15 while profitability appears to have a 
negative relationship with leverage (Michaelas, Chittenden and Poutziouris, 1999; 
                                                          
12
 For instance, leasing provides small business owners with the option to terminate two commitments – asset ownership and 
financing. There is also the possibility of mispricing by leasing companies, charging the same rate for all types of businesses, which 
small business owners may find attractive (Ang, 1992). 
13
 Cassar (2004) finds that asset structure has a significant influence on capital structure, being negatively related to leverage and 
outside financing and positively related to long-term leverage and bank financing. Ortqvist et al. (2006) also find that asset structure 
is the single most important determinant of capital structure, being strongly negatively related to shrt-term debt and strongly 
positively related to long-term debt. 
14
 For a detailed explanation, see Walker (1989); Berger and Udell (1998); Fluck, Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1998); Michaelas, 
Chittenden and Poutziouris (1999); Barbosa and Moraes (2004); Lucey and Bhaird (2006); and Coleman (2008). 
15
 As shown by Fluck, Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1998); Michaelas, Chittenden and Poutziouris (1999); Barbosa and Moraes (2004); 
Cassar (2004); and Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2007). 
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Barbosa and Moraes, 2004; Coleman, 2008). There is some disagreement regarding the 
relationship of age and the entrepreneur’s risk-tolerance with firm leverage.16  
 
Table 1 summarizes the main empirical evidence regarding the determinants of capital 
structure. 
 
Nevertheless, the controversy of the results may reflect differences on the 
market/context, methods of analysis and sample chara teristics. 
 
2.4 The Impact of Macroeconomic Conditions  
 
In this subsection, we will focus on the effect of macroeconomic conditions not only on 
capital structure, but also in firm entry and survival.  
 
The ability to raise capital is affected by fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions, 
such as shocks to the financial sector (Berger and Udell, 1998). In periods of economic 
expansion, firms are typically able to borrow more funds (Hackbarth, Miao and 
Morellec, 2006), whereas in periods of recession, established firms with a record of 
good performance are more likely to be able to raise new debt compared to new and 
young ventures (Ferri and Jones, 1979). Average short-term debt ratios increase during 
periods of economic recession and decrease as the economic conditions improve. In 
contrast, long-term debt ratios are positively related to economic growth (Michaelas, 
Chittenden and Poutziouris, 1999). Depressed economic conditions are also associated 
with the likelihood of non-repayment of debt (Leeth and Scott, 1989).  
                                                          
16 For example, see Michaelas, Chittenden and Poutziouris (1999); Barbosa and Moraes (2004); Cassar (2004); Lucey and Bhaird 




As noted before, young firms are more likely to bear a disproportionate share of loss of 
funding that occurs when there is a market failure because of the information opacity 
problem (Berger and Udell, 1998). Also, a financial crunch impairs the ability of 
entrepreneurs to innovate, as they substitute internal finance towards working capital 
purposes (Gries and Naude, 2011). During periods of crisis, trade creditors may provide 
extra funds to compensate for the loss of bank funding (Berger and Udell, 1998).  
 
Firm entry and survival are also affected by macroeonomic conditions. Recent studies 
that investigate the impact of the 2008-2009 financi l risis on new firm creation find 
that the crisis negatively affects not only the survival rate of existing firms but also new 
firm creation and funding decisions.17 Because of the current financial crisis, investors’ 
willingness to finance innovative entrepreneurship diminishes significantly and venture 
firms have difficulties in raising follow-on capital (Lerner, 2010; Shane, 2011; Klapper 
and Love, 2011). Lerner (2010) argues that raising money for new entrepreneurial 
ventures has been very difficult due to the collapse of the financial markets and that 
wealthy individual investors are reluctant to fund ventures in today’s economy due to 
increased risk aversion. Klapper and Love (2011) find that the speed and intensity with 
which the crisis affected new firm creation varied by the countries’ income level and 
crisis intensity. They also suggest that countries where start-ups rely more on the 
banking sector are more likely to experience larger contractions in new firm creation as 
a result of the credit crunch and withdrawal of finance that characterized the crisis.  
Bosma and Levie (2010) suggest that nascent entrepren u ial activity dropped from 8 
percent in 2005 to 5 percent in 2009 amongst the U.S. working age population, but 
nonetheless with an increase in necessity-driven entrepreneurship.  
                                                          




The next section develops the hypothesis to evaluate the impact of the recent financial 




















3. Theory and Hypothesis  
 
To finance their activities, new ventures need to raise capital. On a financial crisis 
conjuncture, new ventures will have more difficulties in raising capital from external 
sources. Therefore, a reduction on the proportion of external capital is expected as 
asymmetric information problems increase. Outside investors will demand more 
information, prefer liquidity over non-liquid asset and will provide less funding than in 
normal economic periods. Moreover, banks may be less willing to provide funds as 
there is shortage of credit and financial institutions struggle to fix their own financial 
and capital situation. Also, anecdotal evidence suggests that general risk-aversion rises 
in times of financial constraint. In contrast, to compensate for the lack of external funds, 
shareholders will raise more funds from their own sources.  This gives entrepreneurs the 
ability to signal to the market that their venture is of quality by investing personal assets 
in the firm (Huyghebaert and Gucht, 2007). 
 
Hypothesis 1: The financial crisis has a negative impact on external capital  
Hypothesis 2: The financial crisis has a positive impact on internal capital 
 
As stated earlier, bank loans play a pivotal role in early venture financing. As the 
financial crisis cripples the liquidity ratios of banks and the amount of bad debts rise, 
bank loans should decrease for new ventures, especially for the ones with no credit 
rating or reputation.  Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between short-term and 
long-term loans. The amount of short-term loans is expected to increase relative to the 
amount of long-term loans. In periods of crisis, long term loans may subject the lender 
to a higher credit risk due to the increased maturity. This is related to the fact that long-
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term loans require a long-term commitment of the firm with the lender, and usually 
young firms are riskier and more prone to bankruptcy than large and/or established 
firms. Also, long-term loans in times of recession might require some sort of collateral 
in the form of tangible assets that younger firms might just still not possess. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The financial crisis has a positive impact on short-term bank loans 
Hypothesis 3b: The financial crisis has a negative impact on long-term bank loans 
 
Trade credit can be an important source of finance for new ventures, providing 
additional funds in periods of shortage of external funding. Petersen and Rajan (1997) 
find that firms use relatively more trade credit when credit from financial institutions is 
not available. They also argue that while short-term trade credit may be routinely used 
to minimize transactions costs, medium-term borrowing against trade credit is a form of 
financing of last resort. Suppliers lend money to firms when banks and other institutions 
are reluctant to do so, especially in periods of financial crisis. Suppliers may have a 
comparative advantage in getting information about the creditworthiness of buyers, they 
can control the buyer by threatening to cut future supplies, they have a better ability to 
seize the goods that are supplied in case the buyer defaults, and they have a greater 
implicit equity stake in the firm’s long term survival (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Love 
(2011) also argues that trade credit serves as an important source of finance for 
financially constrained firms because of the advantages mentioned before, suppliers 
might be better able than financial institutions to overcome information asymmetry 





Hypothesis 4: The financial crisis has a positive impact on trade credit 
 
Just as trade credit, new ventures might use leasing more often in periods of crisis. As 
stated by Ang (2000), the cancellation option present in leasing contracts allows new 
ventures to overcome mistakes. Also, Huyghebaert and Gucht (2007) argue that start-
ups with high adverse selection and risk shifting icentives may recourse to other debt 
sources to compensate the lower bank debt, with a preference on leasing. Adverse 
selection and risk shifting incentive problems are usually heightened in a financial crisis 
due to more asymmetric information problems. Therefore, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The financial crisis has a positive impact on leasing 
 
The hypotheses developed in this section assume that demand for financial resources 
during the financial crisis did not change considerably, and therefore they only consider 





4. Portugal’s Macroeconomic and Financial Environment 
 
To better frame the paper’s results, we will briefly describe the main features of the 
Portuguese economy in the last two decades.  
 
Since joining the European Union in 1986, Portugal became a modernized economy 
with a stable economic growth. Privileged access to the European market, low labor 
costs, inflows of European funds, and low interest ates pushed Portugal’s competitive 
position. Between 1996 and 2000, the economy experienced a period of growth, 
reaching an average annual rate of approximately 4 percent. However, from 2001 to 
2005 growth decelerated, and a recession of approximately 1 percent occurred in 2003. 
Since then, growth has remained very modest. Portugal’s competitive position 
deteriorated in the beginning of 2000, due to the imposition of a fixed exchange rate, the 
enlargement of the European Union in 1999/2000 and the elimination of trade barriers 
with low-income countries. Along with the rest of the world, Portugal entered into a 
recession in 2009 (see Figure 1).18  
 
Deliberate policy choices by successive governments to promote economic growth and 
employment over the last two decades have put Portugal in a position of a high public 
deficit and high public debt. The current financial crisis further highlighted these issues, 
as it aggravated the availability of funds to face th  state’s financial commitments such 
                                                          
18 The 2008-2009 global economic crisis started due to the US’s sub-prime mortgage. It created the biggest economic downturn 
since the great depression. Since its emergence, the economies of developed countries have been facing harsh difficulties, with 
economic recession and unemployment reaching historical highs. This crisis was set off by a complex series of liquidity problems 
and by the housing bubble that started in the US in 2007. Exaggerated sub-prime lending led to evictions and foreclosures, resulting 
in a decline of the securities backing the mortgages. The result was the collapse of financial institutions, the failure of banks and the 
extinction of key businesses. As credit rating agencies failed to correctly evaluate the risk of mortgage-related financial products, 
investors’ confidence declined severely.  
In Europe, the crisis affected banks’ liquidity and the sovereign debts of some particularly vulnerable countries, namely Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal and more recently Italy and Spain. W th banks facing financial constraints, difficulties to keep up with minimum 
regulatory ratios and bad debts, credit and lending activities diminished significantly. 
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as interest payments, public servants’ wages and debts to the private sector, among 
others. 
 
Shortly after the beginning of the financial crisis, Portugal had to bailout two banks as 
they were on the verge of collapsing and affecting the entire Portuguese banking 
system. This led to a considerable stress to the public accounts as it raised an already 
high public deficit, reaching its highest in 2010. Figure 2 shows the evolution of 
Portugal’s Gross Consolidated Debt, in percentage of GDP, over the last ten years. 
From 2000 to 2007, public debt as percentage of GDP rose from 50 to 65 percent, 
whereas from 2007 to 2010 it increased significantly to 85 percent. 
 
With the increased amount of debt raised by Portugal in the financial markets, investors 
and ratings agencies feared that Portugal’s high debt and deficit levels would cause the 
country to fail on its financial obligations, just like Ireland and Greece, which made risk 
premiums on government bonds reach historical highs. From 2010 to 2012, the yield 
increased from 4 percent to 14 percent (see Figure 3). 
 
Related to economic performance, the unemployment rate decreased steadily from 4.9 
percent in 1998 to 3.9 percent in 2000. Since then, the unemployment rate has been 
increasing, reaching its highest of 12.7 percent in 2011 (see Figure 4). Table 2 provides 
a brief summary of Portugal’s economic performance by NUTS III regions. 
 
In April 2011, the Portuguese government was forced to request a € 78 billion bailout 
package to avoid bankruptcy. To cope with the state’s financial distress situation and as 
part of the financial bailout program imposed to Portugal by the IMF and the EU, 
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Portugal enacted several austerity measures to reduce its budget deficit. Such measures 
ranged from raising income and indirect taxes, lowering public servants’ wages and 
























5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our analysis draws on a matched employer-employee database (QP - “Quadros de 
Pessoal”) combined with the SCIE (Simplified Corporate Information) financial 
database. 
 
QP is a mandatory survey submitted annually to the Portuguese Ministry of 
Employment and Social Security (MESS) by firms with at least one employee. It 
gathers comprehensive information on more than 200,00  firms and 2,000,000 
individuals per year, covering almost the entire Portuguese private sector from 1986 to 
2009. The mandatory nature of the data and its public availability imply a high degree 
of coverage and reliability. As individuals and firms are matched by a unique identifier, 
the longitudinal dimension of the database makes it possible to trace the mobility of 
entrepreneurs across firms, match founders with their respective ventures and identify 
firm entry and exit accurately. The MESS implements several mechanisms to ensure 
that a firm that already has an identifier is not given a different identification number. 
The raw data is organized in three datasets, aggregating information at the firm level, 
individual level and establishment level. For each firm, the following data is available: 
year of creation, location, size, industry, number of establishments, initial capital and 
ownership structure. At the founder level, the datab se contains information on gender, 
age, education and experience. Information on civil servants, armed forces workers, 
agricultural and fisherman workers, self-employed, unpaid family workers, domestic 
work, apprentices and unemployed workers is not available. Only eligible researchers 




As the previous dataset lacks economic and financial information, we use the SCIE. The 
SCIE is available from 2004 to 2009 and it collects year-end information on accounting 
variables on private firms and self-employed indiviuals in Portugal. This database will 
allow us to have detailed information on firm’s capit l structure. The SCIE is a 
mandatory survey that results from institutional cooperation among the Portuguese 
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, National Institute of 
Statistics (INE) and Portuguese Central Bank. It isan integrated reporting system that 
meets different disclosure needs, namely trade registers and provision of notarial 
services, accounting statements and tax returns, production of statistics and economic 
analysis of corporations and activity sectors. An exact match between SCIE and QP was 
provided by the INE. 
 
From the QP, we start by selecting all start-ups establi hed between 2004 and 2009. For 
these new firms, we identify the founders and their background history. We exclude 
firms for which we could not identify at least one owner or the background history of 
the founder.19 We also restrict the sample to founders with age between 20 and 60. In 
total, we end up with 24,375 highly-educated entrepreneurs, who founded 17,239 new 
firms during the period between 2004 and 2009. After m rging with SCIE, we end up 
with 10,936 founders of 7,774 new firms. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics of our sample. The start-ups in our data are 
usually small, employing on average four employees and are founded on average by one 
entrepreneur. Firms were established, on average, in 2007 and only 6,639 survived until 
2009. The founders are mostly men (58 percent) and are on average 34 years old (49 
                                                          
19 For the employees, the data include some cases in which the record changes in gender and year of birth. We consider observations 
with multiple changes in the gender or year of birth to be errors, corresponding to individuals whose identification number was not 
recorded, or wrongly identified by the respondent. We drop individuals whose gender and year of birth change in more than 70 
percent of the total number of observations. 
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percent of founders are aged between 30 and 39, 31 percent are aged between 20 and 
29, 14 percent are aged between 40 and 49 and the remaining 6 percent are aged 
between 50 and 60) . Also, 93 percent of founders have Portuguese nationality and the 
remaining 7 percent are foreign. Regarding the field of education, 24 percent of 
founders are from the business and administration area, 20 percent are from 
engineering, 12 percent are from healthcare and the remaining 44 percent are spread 
across multiple education areas. Finally, 83 percent of founders have no previous 
working experience in the same industry, 66 percent have no previous regional 
experience and 63 percent has had some sort of entrepreneurial experience before. 
 
Regarding capital structure, on average, 54 percent of the financial capital of start-ups 
originates from internal capital, and the remaining 46 percent comes from external 
sources. Leasing and short-term bank loans seem to be important sources of finance, 
representing 8 percent and 6 percent of the financial capital respectively. The average 
amount of internal capital in our sample is € 50,138 while the average amount of 
external capital is € 108,053. On average, short-term bank loans amount to € 15,282, 










6. Methodological Approach, Variables and Results 
 
Our empirical strategy consists in comparing venture start-up financing before and after 
the financial crisis, controlling for variables such as founder and venture characteristics 
and industry and municipality fixed effects.  
 
Nevertheless, we will start by looking at the effects of the recent crisis in firm creation. 
This analysis is relevant because lack of finance is presumably one of the factors that 
constrain firm creation. This analysis will allow us to better understand the impact of 
the crisis on ventures’ initial capital structure possibly due to credit constraints. 
Therefore, using a Linear Probability Model (LPM), we investigate the statistical 
significance of the relationship between the financi l risis and new firm creation using 
the following specification: 
 






		 +  	+ 	  (1) 
 
where m stands for municipality, i for industry and y for year.  
 
Our dependent variable, Entry, is a dummy variable equaling one for start-ups and zero 
for established firms. We retrieve all established firms and new firms created between 
2004 and 2009 from QP. Our variable of interest is Cri is, which refers to the financial 
crisis. This variable is measured in three distinct ways: (i) as a dummy variable, Crisis 
2008, equal to one in 2008, and zero otherwise; (ii) as a dummy variable, Crisis 2009, 
equal to one in 2009, and zero otherwise, and; (iii) because the data for 2008 may not 
yet pick up the impact of the crisis in Portugal, we use the two crisis dummies to 
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identify the years 2008 and 2009. We expect the coeffi ients associated with the 
variable Crisis to be negative,  < 0, because as noted before, a more pronounced 
financial crisis leads to less firm entry. 
 
The results for the specification (1) are presented in Table 5. On the first column, we 
test the specification with the crisis dummy for 2008, the second column tests the 
specification with the crisis dummy for 2009 and the ird column presents the results 
with both crisis dummies. Column 1 suggests that firm entry increased in 2008 by a 
magnitude of 0.01. Column 2 shows that in 2009, firm creation diminished by a 
magnitude of 0.02, and column 3 confirms this result. Results are statistically significant 
and suggest that the negative impact of the crisis on firm creation is only felt in 2009, 
although by a small amount. 
 
With these results, we can conclude that the financial crisis or the fear of a spread to 
Europe and/or Portugal started to negatively affect firm creation in 2009. 
 
As our dependent variable is a dummy variable, we test the specification with Logit and 
Probit models, which results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Results confirm our prior 
analysis as the sign of the relationship is exactly the same as in the LPM. 
 
Next, we evaluate the effects of the financial crisis on new venture’s capital structure 












where f refers to founder of a start-up, m stands for municipality, y for the entry year 
and i for industry.  
 
In order to test our hypotheses, we analyze several d pendent variables, Y described on 
Table 3.  
 
Our main model includes the vector Xf to control for firm and founder characteristics. 
The vector includes: venture initial size (logarithm of the initial number of employees); 
founder’s gender (which equals one for men and zero for women); four categorical 
variables for age (Age20-29 is coded one for individuals with age between 20 and 29; 
Age30-39 is coded one for individuals with age between 30 and 39; Age40-49 is coded 
one for individuals with age between 40 and 49 and; Age50-60 is coded one for 
individuals with age between 50 and 60); industry experience (which equals one if the 
founder has previous working experience in the same industry and zero otherwise); 
entrepreneurial experience (which equals one if the founder has previous experience in 
founding new ventures and zero otherwise) and; regional experience (which equals one 
if the founder has previously worked in the same municipality and zero otherwise).  In 
reporting the estimated coefficients our omitted category is founders aged 20-29.  We 
also control for industry (two-digit industry code) and municipality fixed effects. 
 
Venture size is likely to influence capital structure as bigger start-ups have the ability to 
secure more sources of funding. Founder characteristics are also likely to play a role in 
the regression results. In fact, Nofsinger and Wang (2009) find that entrepreneurial 
experience is helpful in obtaining financing from institutional investors as it can offset 
the importance of investor protection. Also, several studies link human capital variables 
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with external financial capital (Barbosa and Moraes, 2004). For example, the 
entrepreneurs’ beliefs and experience have been shown to influence decisions regarding 
VC financing (Smith, 2011). 
 
The results of the impact of the financial crisis on the internal capital ratio (IR) are 
presented in Table 8. The IR is defined as the internal capital divided by the financial 
capital. Internal capital refers to all the funding that originates from internal sources, 
such as founders’ initial capital. Financial capital s defined as the sum of internal and 
external capital. We expect an increase in IR in a fi ncial crisis conjuncture as outside 
credit gets more restricted. On column 1, we test the specification with the crisis 
dummy for 2008, on column 2 we test the specification with the crisis dummy for 2009 
and the third column presents the results with both crisis dummies. Columns 1 and 2 
show that IR decreased in 2008 by a magnitude of 0.03 but increased in 2009 by a 
magnitude of 0.03. Both results are statistically significant. When we regress with both 
crisis dummies in column 3, the results become non-sig ificant, suggesting that there 
was no significant change in the fraction of internal capital in the capital structure of 
new ventures. The results also show that IR decreases with the size of the firm, and 
when the founder is male and has no previous industry and/or entrepreneurial 
experience. 
 
Table 9 presents the results for the external capital ra io (ER). This ratio is defined by 
the external capital divided by the financial capitl. External capital includes all sources 
of external finance such as bank loans, leasing and trade credit (see Table 3 for a 
detailed description of the variable). We expect ER to decrease with a financial crisis, as 
outside investors are more cautious and reluctant in providing funding. Columns 1 and 2 
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suggest that ER increased in 2008 by a magnitude of 0.03 and decreased in 2009 by a 
magnitude of 0.03, confirming our hypothesis that ex ernal capital diminishes in a 
financial crisis conjuncture. Both results are stati ically significant. However, when 
regressing both crisis dummies in column 3, results become non-significant, suggesting 
that there was no significant change on the weight of external capital. In contrast with 
our results regarding IR, our data shows that external capital increases with the initial 
size of the new venture and when the founder is male and has industry and 
entrepreneurial experience. 
 
Table 10 presents the results for short-term bank loans ratio (STBR). This ratio is 
defined as the amount of short-term bank loans divided by the financial capital. These 
are loans with a maturity of one year or less. Our expectation is that STBR increases in 
a financial crisis situation, as these types of loans imply less risk to the lender due to 
lower maturity. In these regressions, results are not statistically significant suggesting 
there was no significant change in this ratio due to the financial crisis. However, STBR 
increases with the size of the firm and when the founder has entrepreneurial experience, 
and decreases when founders are aged 40 to 49 years old. 
 
Table 11 presents the results for long-term bank loans ratio (LTBR). This ratio is 
defined as the amount of long-term bank loans divided by the financial capital. These 
are loans with a maturity of more than one year. Our expectation is that LTBR decreases 
in a financial crisis situation, as these types of loans are riskier for the lender due to the 
increased maturity. Results regarding the impact of the financial crisis are not 
statistically significant. Nonetheless, LTBR increas s when the size of the firm 
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increases and when the founder has industry experienc , and decreases when founders 
are aged 40 to 60 years old. 
 
Table 12 presents the results for the trade credit atio (TCR). This ratio is defined as the 
amount of trade credit divided by the financial capit l. Trade credit is defined as clients’ 
current account net of suppliers’ current account (for a detailed description of the 
variable, see Table 3). Our expectation is that the TCR increases with the financial 
crisis, as firms may try to compensate the loss of other types of outside financing with 
trade credit. Regressions with both crisis dummies isolated in columns 1 and 2 produce 
statistically insignificant results. However, when regressing with both crisis dummies in 
column 3, results show an increase of magnitude 0.20 in 2008 and 0.18 in 2009, 
suggesting that this type of financing increased due to a start of shortage of other types 
of external financing. Also, TCR increases when the founder is male and decreases 
when he has entrepreneurial experience. 
 
Finally, Table 13 presents the results regarding the leasing ratio (LR). This ratio is 
defined as the amount of leasing divided by the financial capital. Leasing is calculated 
as the sum of short and long-term leasing contracts. Our expectation is that LR increases 
with a financial crisis, because just as trade credit, firms may try to compensate the loss 
of other kinds of outside financing. Results are not statistically significant, suggesting 
there was no effect on leasing due to the financial crisis. Nevertheless, LR increases 
with the size of the firm and when founders are aged 30 to 60 years old. 
 
In summary, the results suggest that there was a reduction on firm entry in 2009. 
Regarding the capital structure of new ventures, there was no significant change due to 
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the financial crisis. However, results for 2009 indicate that IR tends to increase when 
new ventures have difficulty in raising external capit l and that there seems to be a start 
of shortage of credit in 2009 for new firms as external capital was negatively affected 
and trade credit was positively affected. Finally, leasing, short-term and long-term bank 
loans do not seem to have been affected by the crisis until 2009. The results also suggest 























In this paper we aim to assess the impact of the rec nt financial crisis on firm’s initial 
capital structure. The 2008-2009 crisis has had a considerable effect on the worldwide 
economy and has been characterized with negative economic growth, unemployment 
and shortage of credit. 
 
Using Portuguese micro-level data, we investigate if: i) there was a reduction in firm 
entry due to the financial crisis, and; ii) there was a significant change in funding 
sources for new ventures before and after the financial crisis. 
 
Our results show that, until 2009, the financial crisis did not severely affect new 
Portuguese firms. Nonetheless, there seems to be anindication in the results that suggest 
that as of 2009, a start of shortage of credit was felt in the economy, as external capital 
and firm entry decreased by 0.03 and 0.02 respectively, and internal capital and trade 
credit increased by 0.03 and 0.18 respectively. There was no indication on changes to 
leasing and to short-term and long-term bank loans due to the financial crisis. 
 
Comparing our results to the relevant literature rega ding the impact of macroeconomic 
conditions on firm’s capital structure, we find that our results agree with the fact that in 
periods of financial crisis, external capital is reduced and new firms have to cope with 
financing needs using more internal sources. Also, there is indication that trade credit 
increases in a financial crisis situation. On the other hand, we cannot state that leasing 
also serves as an alternative source of funding for new firms in periods of financial 
crisis. We also cannot attest to the fact that short-term bank loans increase and long-
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term bank loans decrease due to the financial crisis, as results are not statistically 
significant. 
 
Although our belief is that we can appropriately assess the impact of the start of the 
financial crisis on new ventures’ capital structure with the results found in this paper, 
there are some limitations that can be further examined in future studies. The first and 
most important limiting factor in our study is the fact that our dataset only contains data 
until 2009, as 2010 and 2011 were the most problematic years in terms of recession, 
unemployment and high public deficit and debt in Portugal. Secondly, the econometric 
specifications could be further developed to include controls for county-level 
characteristics such as GDP per Capita, Unemployment Rate and Purchasing Power in 
all regressions. Thirdly, a differential impact model could be developed to evaluate if 
the financial crisis has a different impact on different municipalities, using interactions 
of county-level characteristics with the crisis dummies. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the 2008-2009 financial risis impacts the financial 
structure of new ventures and also firm entry. Policy makers and practitioners should 
follow-up in analysing the impact of the financial crisis on firm financing and entry to 
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Figure 1: Portugal’s GDP Growth Rate (2000-2010; %) 
 
Source: Eurostat Database 
Note: 2000-2009 are final values; 2010 is a provisinal value. 
 
 
Figure 2: Portugal’s Gross Consolidated Debt (2000-2 10; % of GDP) 
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Figure 3: Portugal’s 10 Year Government Bond Yield (%, 2000-2012) 
 
Source: Bank of Portugal 
 
 
Figure 4: Portugal’s Unemployment Rate (1998-2011; %) 
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Table 1: Summary of the Empirical Evidence on the Determinants of Capital Structure 
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This table provides a summary of the empirical evidnce on the determinants of capital 
structure based on existing literature.  
 
Note: (+) positive relationship; (-) negative relationship; (n.r.) no relationship; (m.f.) 














Table 2: Summary of Portugal’s Economic Performance by NUTS III Regions 
 
 
This table summarizes Portugal’s economic performance by NUTS III regions using 
data obtained from the INE. GDP per capita, increase in birth rate of new firms and 
GDP were computed as the difference between 2009 and 2008. Credit activities were 
obtained as the difference between 2010 and 2009. Values in grey indicate the regions 


































Portugal 14,00% -300 € 0,92% -3.479.000.000 € 100 -11.132.384 €
Northern 14,10% -300 € 0,53% -1.284.000.000 € 87,64 5.519.848 €
Center 12,60% -100 € 1,11% -315.000.000 € 83,92 595.487 €
Lisbon 14,70% -400 € 1,11% -970.000.000 € 123,33 -19.776.296 €
Alentejo 13,10% -500 € 1,37% -467.000.000 € 87,52 163.017 €
Algarve 17,50% -1.100 € 0,17% -401.000.000 € 100,4 292.863 €
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Table 3: Dependent Variables and Description 






Internal Capital Ratio 
(IR)  
Internal Capital/Financial Capital20 (IC/FC) 
Internal Capital refers to funding arising from 
sources that are connected to the firm and 
founder. Includes share capital,21 share premiums, 
supplementary capital,22 and shareholders’ loans. 
+ 
External Capital Ratio 
(ER) 
External Capital/Financial Capital (EC/FC) 
External Capital refers to initial funds from 
extraneous sources, such as commercial bank 
loans, leasing, trade credit23 and government 
funding (which include subsidies for operational 
activity but not subsidies for investment).24 
- 
Short-Term Bank 
Loans Ratio (STBR) 
Short-term bank loans/Financial Capital 
(STB/FC) 
Short-term bank loans are loans with a maturity of 
one year or less. 
+ 
Long-Term Bank 
Loans Ratio (LTBR) 
Long-term bank loans/Financial Capital (LTB/FC) 
Long-term bank loans are loans with maturity 
over 1 year. 
- 
Trade Credit Ratio 
(TCR) 
Trade credit/Financial Capital (TC/FC) 
Trade credit is a type of funding that results from 
open-account, short-term deferred payment terms 
usually offered by a seller to a buyer. Includes 
clients’ current account, clients’ payable notes, 
advance payments to suppliers and other debtors 
deducted by supplier’s current account, supplier’s 
invoices not yet processed, supplier’s payable 
notes and other creditors. 25 
+ 
Leasing (LR) 
Leasing/Financial Capital (L/FC) 
Leasing are contractual arrangements to pay a 




                                                          
20 Financial Capital is defined as the amount of interal and external capital that a startup was able to raise. 
21 The minimum required capital for a limited liability company in Portugal (Sociedades por Quotas) is 5,000 Euros. All firms in our 
sample are limited liability.
 
22 Supplementary capital is similar to a shareholder loan. However, it does not generate interest and is only claimed when a firm is 
dissolved. 
23 Trade credit is not part of a firms’ debt structure. It is working capital available to firms on daily operations. However, as 
mentioned before, it can be an important source of funds for new and small firms. 
24 Subsidies for operational activity are funds granted to firms to reduce costs or increase profits and re meant to be used in the 
firms’ operational activities. Subsidies to investment are funds granted by the government to buy tangible or intangible assets. 
25  Trade credit includes the following rubrics: Clients c/c + clientes títulos a receber + adiantamentos a fornecedores + outros 
devedores - Fornecedores c/c - Fornecedores facturas em recepção e conferencia - Fornecedores títulos a pagar - outros credores. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Median 
Panel A – Start-ups’ Characteristics 
 
Internal Capital Ratio (IR) 7,774 0.54 0.33 0.53 
External Capital Ratio (ER) 7,774 0.46 0.33 0.47 
Short-Term Bank Loans Ratio (STBR) 7,774 0.06 0.17 0 
Long-Term Bank Loans Ratio (LTBR) 7,774 0.03 0.13 0 
Trade Credit Ratio (TCR) 7,774 -0.07 1.70 0.03 
Leasing Ratio (LR) 7,774 0.08 0.17 0 
 
Panel B – Firms’ Characteristics 
 
Number of initial employees 7,774 3.64 7.41 2 
Number of founders 7,774 1.41 0.59 1 
 
Panel C – Founders’ Characteristics 
 
Age 7,774 33.99 0.77 32 
Number of years of information on founder 7,774 6.98 5.49 5 
 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for start-ups created between 2004 and 2009, and 
respective firms’ and founders’ characteristics. All data was retrieved from the database 


























Table 5: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Firm Entry (LPM) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES E E E 
        
Crisis 2008 0.0116*** 0.00212*** 
(0.000479) (0.000553) 
Crisis 2009 -0.0215*** -0.0205*** 
(0.000444) (0.000515) 
Constant 0.0184 0.0285 0.0275 
(5.253) 
Observations 2,356,798 2,356,798 2,356,798 
R-squared 0.008 0.009 0.009 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
This table uses data on all established and new firms created between 2004 and 2009 
retrieved from the database Quadros de Pessoal. Linear Probability Model is used. The 
dependent variable is “Entry”, which is a dummy equalling 0 for established firms and 1 
for new firms. The variable “Crisis” is defined in three distinct ways: (i) as a dummy 
variable, Crisis 2008, equal to 1 in 2008, and 0 otherwise; (ii) as a dummy variable, 
Crisis 2009, equal to 1 in 2009, and 0 otherwise, and; (iii) two crisis dummies to 




























Table 6: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Firm Entry (Logit) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES E E E 
        
Crisis 2008 0.205*** 0.0345*** 
(0.00822) (0.00913) 
Crisis 2009 -0.422*** -0.405*** 
(0.00941) (0.0104) 
Constant -3.597*** -3.429*** -3.444*** 
(0.906) (0.910) (0.910) 
Observations 2,356,779 2,356,779 2,356,779 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
This table uses data on all established and new firms created between 2004 and 2009 
retrieved from the database Quadros de Pessoal. Logit Model is used. The dependent 
variable is “Entry”, which is a dummy equalling 0 for established firms and 1 for new 
firms. The variable “Crisis” is defined in three distinct ways: (i) as a dummy variable, 
Crisis 2008, equal to 1 in 2008, and 0 otherwise; (ii) as a dummy variable, Crisis 2009, 
equal to 1 in 2009, and 0 otherwise, and; (iii) two crisis dummies to identify the years 


















Table 7: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Firm Entry (Probit) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES E E E 
        
Crisis 2008 0.0968*** 0.0155*** 
(0.00393) (0.00440) 
Crisis 2009 -0.198*** -0.191*** 
(0.00435) (0.00486) 
Constant -1.915*** -1.822*** -1.829*** 
(0.418) (0.421) (0.421) 
Observations 2,356,779 2,356,779 2,356,779 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
This table uses data on all established and new firms created between 2004 and 2009 
retrieved from the database Quadros de Pessoal. Probit Model is used. The dependent 
variable is “Entry”, which is a dummy equalling 0 for established firms and 1 for new 
firms. The variable “Crisis” is defined in three distinct ways: (i) as a dummy variable, 
Crisis 2008, equal to 1 in 2008, and 0 otherwise; (ii) as a dummy variable, Crisis 2009, 
equal to 1 in 2009, and 0 otherwise, and; (iii) two crisis dummies to identify the years 





























Table 8: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Inter al Capital 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES IR IR IR 
        
Crisis 2008 -0.0257* 0.0379 
(0.0132) (0.0429) 
Crisis 2009 0.0310** 0.0682 
(0.0136) (0.0442) 
Gender -0.0189** -0.0191** -0.0192** 
(0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00794) 
Age 30-39 -0.00550 -0.00561 -0.00576 
(0.00873) (0.00873) (0.00873) 
Age 40-49 0.00547 0.00535 0.00528 
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) 
Age 50-60 0.0128 0.0128 0.0127 
(0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) 
Industry experience -0.0382*** -0.0384*** -0.0385*** 
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) 
County experience 0.00313 0.00287 0.00283 
(0.00858) (0.00859) (0.00859) 
Entrepreneurial experience -0.0547*** -0.0558*** -0.0566*** 
(0.00835) (0.00840) (0.00847) 
Size (Log number of initial employees) -0.0733*** -0.0731*** -0.0729*** 
(0.00508) (0.00508) (0.00508) 
Constant 0.949*** 0.921*** 0.884*** 
(0.282) (0.282) (0.285) 
Observations 7,774 7,774 7,774 
R-squared 0.122 0.122 0.122 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
This table uses data on new firms created between 2004 and 2009 retrieved from the 
database Quadros de Pessoal merged with the database Informacao Empresarial 
Simplificada. The dependent variable is “Internal Capital Ratio”, which is defined in 
Table 3. The variable “Crisis” is defined in three distinct ways: (i) as a dummy variable, 
Crisis 2008, equal to 1 in 2008, and 0 otherwise; (ii) as a dummy variable, Crisis 2009, 
equal to 1 in 2009, and 0 otherwise, and; (iii) two crisis dummies to identify the years 
2008 and 2009. The variables “Size”, “Gender”, “Age 30-39”, “Age 40-49”, “Age 50-
60”, “Industry experience”, “County experience” and “Entrepreneurial experience” are 












Table 9: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on External Capital 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ER ER ER 
        
Crisis 2008 0.0257* -0.0379 
(0.0132) (0.0429) 
Crisis 2009 -0.0310** -0.0682 
(0.0136) (0.0442) 
Gender 0.0189** 0.0191** 0.0192** 
(0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00794) 
Age 30-39 0.00550 0.00561 0.00576 
(0.00873) (0.00873) (0.00873) 
Age 40-49 -0.00547 -0.00535 -0.00528 
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) 
Age 50-60 -0.0128 -0.0128 -0.0127 
(0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) 
Industry experience 0.0382*** 0.0384*** 0.0385*** 
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) 
County experience -0.00313 -0.00287 -0.00283 
(0.00858) (0.00859) (0.00859) 
Entrepreneurial experience 0.0547*** 0.0558*** 0.0566*** 
(0.00835) (0.00840) (0.00847) 
Size (Log number of initial employees) 0.0733*** 0.0731*** 0.0729*** 
(0.00508) (0.00508) (0.00508) 
Constant 0.0509 0.0785 0.116 
(0.282) (0.282) (0.285) 
Observations 7,774 7,774 7,774 
R-squared 0.122 0.122 0.122 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
This table uses data on new firms created between 2004 and 2009 retrieved from the 
database Quadros de Pessoal merged with the database Informacao Empresarial 
Simplificada. The dependent variable is “External Capital Ratio”, which is defined in 
Table 3. The variable “Crisis” is defined in three distinct ways: (i) as a dummy variable, 
Crisis 2008, equal to 1 in 2008, and 0 otherwise; (ii) as a dummy variable, Crisis 2009, 
equal to 1 in 2009, and 0 otherwise, and; (iii) two crisis dummies to identify the years 
2008 and 2009. The variables “Size”, “Gender”, “Age 30-39”, “Age 40-49”, “Age 50-
60”, “Industry experience”, “County experience” and “Entrepreneurial experience” are 












Table 10: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Short-Term Bank Loans 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES STBR STBR STBR 
        
Crisis 2008 0.00515 -0.0358 
(0.00649) (0.0304) 
Crisis 2009 -0.00874 -0.0440 
(0.00651) (0.0309) 
Gender -0.00232 -0.00227 -0.00217 
(0.00411) (0.00412) (0.00412) 
Age 30-39 -0.00254 -0.00252 -0.00238 
(0.00458) (0.00458) (0.00457) 
Age 40-49 -0.0111* -0.0110* -0.0110* 
(0.00605) (0.00605) (0.00605) 
Age 50-60 -0.00402 -0.00403 -0.00394 
(0.00910) (0.00910) (0.00909) 
Industry experience 0.00705 0.00718 0.00723 
(0.00539) (0.00540) (0.00540) 
County experience 0.00473 0.00489 0.00493 
(0.00446) (0.00446) (0.00447) 
Entrepreneurial experience 0.0125*** 0.0130*** 0.0137*** 
(0.00430) (0.00432) (0.00440) 
Size (Log number of initial employees) 0.0140*** 0.0139*** 0.0137*** 
(0.00259) (0.00259) (0.00259) 
Constant -0.0187 -0.0122 0.0234 
(0.0990) (0.0988) (0.103) 
Observations 7,774 7,774 7,774 
R-squared 0.088 0.089 0.089 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
This table uses data on new firms created between 2004 and 2009 retrieved from the 
database Quadros de Pessoal merged with the database Informacao Empresarial 
Simplificada. The dependent variable is “Short-term Bank Loans Ratio”, which is 
defined in Table 3. The variable “Crisis” is defined in three distinct ways: (i) as a 
dummy variable, Crisis 2008, equal to 1 in 2008, and 0 otherwise; (ii) as a dummy 
variable, Crisis 2009, equal to 1 in 2009, and 0 otherwise, and; (iii) two crisis dummies 
to identify the years 2008 and 2009. The variables “Size”, “Gender”, “Age 30-39”, 
“Age 40-49”, “Age 50-60”, “Industry experience”, “County experience” and 
“Entrepreneurial experience” are controls for founder and firm characteristics. All 











Table 11: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Long-Term Bank Loans 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES LTBR LTBR LTBR 
        
Crisis 2008 0.00522 -0.0230 
(0.00517) (0.0216) 
Crisis 2009 -0.00766 -0.0303 
(0.00517) (0.0218) 
Gender -0.000518 -0.000482 -0.000417 
(0.00322) (0.00322) (0.00322) 
Age 30-39 -0.00620* -0.00617 -0.00608 
(0.00376) (0.00376) (0.00376) 
Age 40-49 -0.0140*** -0.0140*** -0.0139*** 
(0.00478) (0.00478) (0.00478) 
Age 50-60 -0.0208*** -0.0208*** -0.0207*** 
(0.00560) (0.00560) (0.00559) 
Industry experience 0.00768* 0.00778* 0.00780* 
(0.00450) (0.00450) (0.00450) 
County experience -0.00517 -0.00506 -0.00504 
(0.00335) (0.00335) (0.00335) 
Entrepreneurial experience 0.00218 0.00254 0.00301 
(0.00347) (0.00348) (0.00349) 
Size (Log number of initial employees) 0.0112*** 0.0111*** 0.0110*** 
(0.00208) (0.00208) (0.00207) 
Constant -0.202 -0.196 -0.173 
(0.170) (0.170) (0.171) 
Observations 7,774 7,774 7,774 
R-squared 0.105 0.105 0.105 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
This table uses data on new firms created between 2004 and 2009 retrieved from the 
database Quadros de Pessoal merged with the database Informacao Empresarial 
Simplificada. The dependent variable is “Long-term Bank Loans Ratio”, which is 
defined in Table 3. The variable “Crisis” is defined in three distinct ways: (i) as a 
dummy variable, Crisis 2008, equal to 1 in 2008, and 0 otherwise; (ii) as a dummy 
variable, Crisis 2009, equal to 1 in 2009, and 0 otherwise, and; (iii) two crisis dummies 
to identify the years 2008 and 2009. The variables “Size”, “Gender”, “Age 30-39”, 
“Age 40-49”, “Age 50-60”, “Industry experience”, “County experience” and 
“Entrepreneurial experience” are controls for founder and firm characteristics. All 











Table 12: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Trade Credit 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES TCR TCR TCR 
        
Crisis 2008 0.0299 0.195** 
(0.0579) (0.0947) 
Crisis 2009 -0.0146 0.177** 
(0.0572) (0.0801) 
Gender 0.0656* 0.0656* 0.0651* 
(0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0342) 
Age 30-39 -0.000898 -0.000810 -0.00156 
(0.0383) (0.0382) (0.0383) 
Age 40-49 0.0439 0.0438 0.0434 
(0.0509) (0.0509) (0.0510) 
Age 50-60 0.257 0.257 0.256 
(0.207) (0.207) (0.207) 
Industry experience -0.0424 -0.0428 -0.0431 
(0.0357) (0.0357) (0.0358) 
County experience 0.0319 0.0314 0.0312 
(0.0387) (0.0386) (0.0386) 
Entrepreneurial experience -0.0924* -0.0932* -0.0972* 
(0.0535) (0.0532) (0.0543) 
Size (Log number of initial employees) 0.0214 0.0214 0.0225 
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0202) 
Constant 3.571*** 3.596*** 3.402*** 
(0.471) (0.467) (0.474) 
Observations 7,774 7,774 7,774 
R-squared 0.030 0.030 0.030 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
This table uses data on new firms created between 2004 and 2009 retrieved from the 
database Quadros de Pessoal merged with the database Informacao Empresarial 
Simplificada. The dependent variable is “Trade Credit Ratio”, which is defined in Table 
3. The variable “Crisis” is defined in three distinct ways: (i) as a dummy variable, Crisis 
2008, equal to 1 in 2008, and 0 otherwise; (ii) as a dummy variable, Crisis 2009, equal 
to 1 in 2009, and 0 otherwise, and; (iii) two crisis dummies to identify the years 2008 
and 2009. The variables “Size”, “Gender”, “Age 30-39”, “Age 40-49”, “Age 50-60”, 
“Industry experience”, “County experience” and “Entrepreneurial experience” are 












Table 13: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Leasing 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES LR LR LR 
        
Crisis 2008 0.00135 0.00584 
(0.00677) (0.0163) 
Crisis 2009 -0.000924 0.00482 
(0.00706) (0.0173) 
Gender 0.000803 0.000803 0.000787 
(0.00425) (0.00425) (0.00425) 
Age 30-39 0.00939** 0.00939** 0.00937** 
(0.00458) (0.00458) (0.00458) 
Age 40-49 0.0159** 0.0159** 0.0159** 
(0.00689) (0.00689) (0.00689) 
Age 50-60 0.0211** 0.0211** 0.0211** 
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Industry experience 0.00110 0.00108 0.00108 
(0.00585) (0.00586) (0.00586) 
County experience 0.00561 0.00559 0.00559 
(0.00453) (0.00453) (0.00453) 
Entrepreneurial experience 0.00250 0.00249 0.00237 
(0.00450) (0.00454) (0.00459) 
Size (Log number of initial employees) 0.0170*** 0.0170*** 0.0171*** 
(0.00274) (0.00274) (0.00275) 
Constant -0.0299 -0.0287 -0.0345 
(0.0530) (0.0529) (0.0553) 
Observations 7,774 7,774 7,774 
R-squared 0.081 0.081 0.081 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
This table uses data on new firms created between 2004 and 2009 retrieved from the 
database Quadros de Pessoal merged with the database Informacao Empresarial 
Simplificada. The dependent variable is “Leasing Ratio”, which is defined in Table 3. 
The variable “Crisis” is defined in three distinct ways: (i) as a dummy variable, Crisis 
2008, equal to 1 in 2008, and 0 otherwise; (ii) as a dummy variable, Crisis 2009, equal 
to 1 in 2009, and 0 otherwise, and; (iii) two crisis dummies to identify the years 2008 
and 2009. The variables “Size”, “Gender”, “Age 30-39”, “Age 40-49”, “Age 50-60”, 
“Industry experience”, “County experience” and “Entrepreneurial experience” are 
controls for founder and firm characteristics. All models include county and industry 
fixed effects. 
